Constructive interference based secure precoding:A new dimension in physical layer security by Khandaker, Muhammad R. A. et al.
2256 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 13, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 2018
Constructive Interference Based Secure Precoding:
A New Dimension in Physical Layer Security
Muhammad R. A. Khandaker , Christos Masouros, and Kai-Kit Wong
Abstract— Conventionally, interference and noise are treated
as catastrophic elements in wireless communications. However,
it has been shown recently that exploiting known interfer-
ence constructively can contribute to signal detection ability at
the receiving end. This paper exploits this concept to design
artificial noise (AN) beamformers constructive to the intended
receiver (IR) yet keeping AN disruptive to possible eavesdroppers
(Eves). The scenario considered here is a multiple-input single-
output wiretap channel with multiple Eves. This paper starts
from AN design without any knowledge of Eve’s CSI, builds
with solutions with statistical CSI up to full CSI. Both perfect
and imperfect channel information have been considered, in par-
ticular, with different extent of Eves’ channel responses. The
main objective is to improve the receive signal-to-interference
and noise ratio at IR through exploitation of AN power in an
attempt to minimize the total transmit power, while hindering
detection at the Eves. Numerical simulations demonstrate that
the proposed constructive AN precoding approach yields superior
performance over conventional AN schemes in terms of transmit
power. Critically, they show that, while the statistical constraints
of conventional approaches may lead to instantaneous IR out-
ages and security breaches from the Eves, the instantaneous
constraints of our approach guarantee both IR performance and
secrecy at every symbol period.
Index Terms— Interference exploitation, constructive interfer-
ence, physical layer security, robust design.
I. INTRODUCTION
F IFTH-GENERATION (5G) wireless communication sys-tems aim to achieve ultra-high spectral efficiency (SE)
and orders-of-magnitude improved energy efficiency (EE).
It is also expected that 5G networks will operate in mul-
tiple tiers deploying ultra-dense small-cell base stations
(BSs), e.g., heterogeneous networks (HetNets). However,
a major bottleneck in ultra-dense HetNets is the cross-tier and
co-tier interference. In order to harvest the full potentials of
5G, developing sophisticated interference handling tools is a
crying need at the moment.
Traditional approach to dealing with interference is to sup-
press the interference power in order to improve system perfor-
mance [1], [2]. However, recent developments in interference
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exploitation techniques have revolutionised this traditional way
of dealing with known interferences [3], [4]. Constructive
interference (CI) precoding approaches suggest that interfer-
ence power can even contribute to the received signal power
if properly exploited [3]–[8]. This concept introduces a major
breakthrough in designing wireless communication precoding
when the interference is known at the transmitter. In particular,
downlink beamforming design can be significantly improved
by symbol-level precoding of known interferences [7]–[10].
With the knowledge of the users’ data symbols and channel
state information (CSI), the interference can be classified
as constructive and destructive interferences. The theory and
characterization criteria for constructive interference have been
extensively studied in [3]–[10]. More recently, the concept
has been exploited in energy harvesting systems [11], hybrid
beamforming [12], cognitive radio networks [13] and massive
MIMO systems [14]–[17]. The interference signals will be
constructive to the desired signal if that moves the received
symbols away from the decision thresholds of the constellation
(e.g. real and imaginary axes for QPSK symbols) towards
the direction of the desired symbol. In order to keep the
angle of the interference signals aligned with the angle of
the corresponding desired symbol, the transmit beamforming
vectors need to be carefully designed.
The broadcast nature of wireless channels makes the com-
munication naturally susceptible to various security threats.
However, the security of wireless data transmission has tra-
ditionally been entrusted to key-based cryptographic meth-
ods at the network layer. Recently, physical-layer security
(PLS) approaches have attracted a great deal of attention
in the information-theoretic society since the accompany-
ing techniques can afford an extra security layer on top
of the traditional cryptographic approaches [18]–[24]. PLS
exploits the channel-induced physical layer dynamics to pro-
vide information security. With appropriately designed coding
and transmit precoding schemes in addition to the exploita-
tion of any available CSI, PLS schemes enable secret com-
munication over a wireless medium without the aid of an
encryption key.
The extent of eavesdropper’s CSI available at the transmitter
plays a vital role in determining the corresponding optimal
transmission scheme. If full CSI of all the links is available
at the transmitter, then the spatial degrees of freedom (DoF)
can be fully exploited to block interception [21]. However,
it is generally very unrealistic in practice. In particular, it is
almost impossible to obtain perfect eavesdroppers’ CSI since
eavesdroppers are often unknown malicious agents. The situa-
tion can further worsen if multiple eavesdroppers cooperate
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Fig. 1. Exploiting AN to boost secrecy performance. (a) Conventional isotropic AN. (b) Conventional spatially selective AN. (c) Constructive AN to boost
received signal power.
in an attempt to maximize their interception through
joint receive beamforming. Hence Li and Ma [21] and
Khandaker and Wong [22], [23] considered robust secrecy
beamforming design based on deterministic channel uncer-
tainty models whereas [25] considered probabilistic robust
design.
To make physical-layer secrecy viable, we usually need
the legitimate user’s channel condition to be better than the
eavesdroppers’. However, this may not always be guaranteed
in practice. To alleviate the dependence on the channel con-
ditions, recent studies showed that the spatial DoF provided
by multi-antenna technology can be exploited to degrade the
reception of the eavesdroppers [20], [21]. A possible way to do
this is transmit beamforming, which concentrates the transmit
signal over the direction of the legitimate user while reducing
power leakage to the eavesdroppers at the same time. Apart
from this, a more operational approach is to send artificially
generated noise signals to interfere the eavesdroppers delib-
erately [20]–[23]. Depending on the extent of eavesdroppers
CSI available at the transmitter, different strategies can be
applied to generate the optimal AN beams. If no eavesdrop-
pers’ CSI is available, then a popular design is the isotropic
AN [20], where the message is transmitted in the direction
of the intended receiver’s channel, and spatio-temporal AN is
uniformly spread on the orthogonal subspace of the legitimate
channel (see Fig. 1a). This scheme guarantees that the intended
receiver’s (IR’s) reception will be free from the interference by
the AN, while the Eves’ reception may be degraded by the AN.
On the other hand, with knowledge of the eavesdroppers’
CSI to some extent, one can block the eavesdroppers’ inter-
ception more efficiently by generating spatially selective AN
(see Fig. 1b) [21], [22]. More recently, an antenna array based
directional modulation scheme (DM) has been studied which
enhances security through adjusting the amplitude and phase
of the transmit signal along a specific direction by varying
the length of the reflector antennas for each symbol while
scrambling the symbols in other directions [26]–[29]. Note that
the AN is in general disruptive to the legitimate receivers as
well, in the above (conventional) schemes. This creates serious
problems particularly when exact CSI can not be obtained.
This motivates us to rethink the role of interferences as well
as the AN.
In this paper, we exploit the knowledge of interference
readily available at the transmitter for improving security
in wireless systems [30]. In this context, we redesign AN
signals in the form of constructive interference to the IR
while keeping AN disruptive to potential Eves. We consider a
multiple-input single-output (MISO) downlink system in the
presence of multiple Eves as shown in Fig. 1c. We aim at min-
imizing the total transmit power while boosting the received
SINR at the IR as well as degrading the Eves’ SINR below
certain threshold. The benefits of constructive interference-
based AN precoding scheme is twofold compared to conven-
tional AN-based physical-layer security schemes considered
in [20]–[23]. Firstly, the constructive AN will boost the
receive SINR at the IR as opposed to the conventional AN-
based schemes which attempt to suppress AN signals along
the direction of the IR. Secondly, to achieve a predefined
level of SINR at the IR, constructive interference based
precoding scheme requires lower power compared to con-
ventional AN precoding, thus diminishing inter-user as well
as inter-cell interferences. Depending on the extent of eaves-
dropping information available at the transmitter, we pro-
pose different constructive interference based secure precoding
schemes. In particular, we consider different scenarios with
i) no eavesdropping CSI, ii) Eves’ statistical CSI, and iii) Eves’
full CSI, perfect and imperfect. Numerical simulations demon-
strate that the proposed constructive AN precoding approaches
yield superior performance over conventional schemes in terms
of transmit power. For clarity, the contributions are summa-
rized below:
1) We first consider the case when no information is
available about the eavesdroppers, with perfect IR CSI.
We propose constructive interference based AN design
for the IR as opposed to the conventional isotropic AN
design onto the null space of the IR.
2) Then, we design a secure precoding scheme with eaves-
droppers’ CSI statistics available, such that the AN
is constructive to the IR while satisfying statistical
eavesdropping constraints thus reducing the required
transmit power for given performance and secrecy
requirements.
3) Next, when full CSI is available, this allows the design
to move one step further to satisfy instantaneous SINR
constraints at all nodes such that the AN is constructive
to the IR and destructive to Eves, further impeding signal
detection at the Eves and reducing the required transmit
power to guarantee predefined security.
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4) We further develop a computationally efficient algorithm
for the constructive AN precoding scheme based on
projected gradient approach.
5) Finally, we design worst-case robust secure precoders in
the presence of imperfect CSI of all the nodes.
In all cases, the proposed schemes outperform the conventional
AN-aided secure precoding schemes. Note that only the full
CSI case has been considered in [30] without proposing any
efficient solver.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the model of a secret MISO downlink system is introduced.
Section III demonstrates how constructive interference pre-
coding scheme boosts receive SINR. The SINR-constrained
power minimization problems with a) no Eves’ CSI, b) Eves’
statistical CSI, and c) all-perfect CSI have been studied in
Sections IV, V, and VI, respectively. In Section VII,
we develop an efficient solver for the constructive-destructive
precoding problem. On the other hand, robust constructive
AN precoding has been designed in Section VIII. Section IX
presents the simulation results that justify the significance of
the proposed algorithms under various scenarios. Concluding
remarks are provided in Section X.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Following [31], we consider a MISO downlink system
where the transmitter (BS) equipped with NT transmit anten-
nas intends to transmit a secret message to the IR in the
presence of K possible eavesdroppers. The IR and the Eves
are all equipped with a single antenna for notational simplicity,
while our techniques can be readily extended to multi-antenna
receivers. In order to confuse the Eves, the BS injects AN
signals into the secret message in an attempt to reduce the
receive SINRs at the Eves. Thus the received signal at the IR
and those at the Eves are given, respectively, by yd and ye,k :
yd = hTd x + nd, (1)
ye,k = hTe,kx + ne,k, for k = 1, . . . , K , (2)
where hd and he,k are the complex channel vectors between
the BS and the IR and between the BS and the kth Eve,
respectively, nd ∼ CN (0, σ 2d ) and ne,k ∼ CN (0, σ 2e ) are
the additive Gaussian noises at the IR and the kth Eve,
respectively. The BS chooses x as the sum of information
beamforming vector bdsd and the AN vector z such that the
baseband transmit signal vector is
x = bdsd + z, (3)
where sd = de jφd is the confidential information-bearing
symbol for the IR, d indicates the constant amplitude and φd
is the phase.
Accordingly, the received SINR at the IR is given by
γd =
∣
∣hTd bd
∣
∣
2
∣
∣hTd z
∣
∣
2 + σ 2d
, (4)
and that at the kth Eve is given by
γe,k =
∣
∣
∣hTe,kbd
∣
∣
∣
2
∣
∣
∣hTe,kz
∣
∣
∣
2 + σ 2e
,∀k. (5)
The transmit signal x can also be expressed as
x = bdsd + ze− jφd sd (6)
Assuming constant envelop1 d = 1, the instantaneous transmit
power is given by
PT = ‖bdsd + z‖2 =
∥
∥
∥bd + ze− jφd
∥
∥
∥
2
. (7)
In the following, we design precoding schemes for instanta-
neous transmit power minimization exploiting known interfer-
ence (AN in this case) power.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE
PRECODING TECHNIQUE
Recent advances in interference exploitation have demon-
strated that constructive interference precoding techniques
can significantly improve receive SINR thus reducing signal
detection errors. The theory and characterization criteria for
constructive interference have been extensively studied first
in the context of code division multiple access (CDMA)
systems [9], [32]–[34], and more recently to MIMO systems
in [3]–[6] and [8]. To avoid repetition, we refer the readers to
the above works for the details, while here we employ this
concept directly to design our new optimization problems.
We will actively exploit interference (AN in this case) con-
structively for the IR to reduce the required power for a given
SINR threshold, while guaranteeing the secrecy constraint for
the Eves. The AN signal will be constructive to the received
signal at the IR if that moves the received symbols away
from the decision thresholds of the constellation (e.g. real
and imaginary axes for QPSK symbols in Fig. 2a).2 Hence
we intend to keep the angle of that part aligned with the
angle of the corresponding desired symbol sd by appropriately
designing the transmit beamforming vectors. We can do so by
pushing the decision symbols towards the constructive regions
of the modulation constellation, denoted by the green shaded
areas (cf. Fig. 2a).
For constructive precoding, the AN signals received at
the IR are not suppressed or nullified in contrast to the
conventional use of AN [21], [22], [31], rather optimized
instantaneously such that they contribute to the received sig-
nal power. If the AN signals can be aligned with the data
symbols sd by properly designing the beamforming precoding
vectors, then the AN signals will contribute constructively.
Accordingly, it has been shown in [6] and [8] that the receive
SINR (4) at the IR can be rewritten as
γd =
∣
∣hTd bd + hTd ze− jφd
∣
∣
2
σ 2d
. (8)
Note that the receive SINR at the IR has actually become SNR
after constructive AN precoding. However, the SINR at the kth
1Without loss of generality, we assume d = 1 in this paper for notational
convenience. However, our analyses are valid for any value of d.
2Although we selected QPSK as a representative modulation scheme for
exposition, the proposed algorithms and our analyses apply to any PSK
modulation scheme. Moreover, the proposed methodologies can be straight-
forwardly adapted for multi-level modulation schemes like QAM following
the analyses in [12].
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Fig. 2. Exploiting constructive and destructive AN for QPSK symbols. (a) Constructive AN design for the legitimate receiver. Constructive interference
power pushes the decision symbols towards the constructive regions of the modulation constellation, denoted by the green shaded areas. (b) Destructive AN
design for the eavesdropper. Destructive AN pushes the received signal at the Eves away from the decision thresholds (red zone).
Eve remains the same as in (5) since no AN signal has been
made constructive to the Eves.
Thus exploiting AN power constructively, the instantaneous
SINR constraint at the IR can be formulated as the following
system of constraints

(
hTd bd + hTd ze− jφd
)
=  (sd) (9a)
 {hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}2
σ 2d
≥ d, (9b)
where d is the SINR requirement for correct detection at
the IR, {x} indicates the real part of the complex number
x and  x denotes the corresponding angle. Note that the
phases of the AN signals in (9b) have been shifted by the
phase of the desired symbol sd. The constraint (9a) imposes
that the AN fully aligns with the phase of the symbol of
interest sd at the IR, whereas the constraint (9b) guarantees
that the constructively precoded AN signals can adequately
satisfy the SINR requirement at the IR. We note that this
signal alignment will only hold for the structure of the IR’s
channel hd, while there will be no such alignment for the Eves’
channels he,k .
Essentially, the angular constraint (9a) is a very strict
constraint. But exploiting the concept of constructive inter-
ference, we can actually relax this constraint without losing
any optimality which results in a larger feasible region. Let us
denote y˜d  hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)
as the received signal ignoring
the AWGN at the IR, with constructive AN injected, and αR
and αI as the abscissa and the ordinate of the phase-adjusted
signal y˜d, respectively. Applying basic geometric principles to
Fig. 2a, the constraints in (9) can be equivalently represented
as

{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
= 0 (10a)

{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
≥ σd
√
d, (10b)
where {x} indicates the imaginary part of the complex
number x . However, it can be observed from Fig. 2a that the
AN contaminated received signal y˜d does not necessarily need
to strictly align the angle of the desired signal. That is, y˜d lays
on the constructive zone of the desired symbol sd as long as
the following condition is satisfied
−θ ≤ φd ≤ θ, i.e., |αI|
αR − ˜d
≤ tan θ, (11)
where ˜d  σd
√
d and θ = π/M , M is the constellation
size. Thus the strict angle constraint (10a) can be relaxed as
∣
∣
∣
{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}∣
∣
∣
≤
(

{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
− σd
√
d
)
tan θ. (12)
Note that the relaxed angular constraint (12) allows a larger
feasibility region (entire green zone in Fig. 2a). Interestingly,
the QoS constraint d is embedded in (12). Hence we do
not need to explicitly impose it in the optimization procedure.
In the following, we exploit this constructive interference
constraint in various scenarios depending on the extent of CSI
available at the transmitter.
IV. UNKNOWN EAVESDROPPERS’ CSI
In many practical scenarios, it is often difficult to obtain
any information about the eavesdroppers’ CSI, or it may
even be impractical to assume that the transmitter is aware
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of the presence of an Eve at all. However, communication
secrecy can still be improved by transmitting AN. In order
to ensure secure communication in such cases, a reasonable
approach is to allocate minimum resources necessary to obtain
a certain level of quality-of-service (QoS) for the IR, and
devote all other resources to making interception of the signal
more difficult. However, the downside is that the secrecy
performance of such a scheme cannot be guaranteed. The
eavesdropper’s received signal at a defined location can be
of better quality than the IR’s thus allowing information
leakage. In this section, we study conventional and interference
exploitation approaches to make the probability of such an
event as low as possible when no information is available about
the potential eavesdroppers.
A. Conventional Isotropic AN Design
A conventional approach is to allocate a fraction ρ of the
available transmit power Pt for transmitting the confiden-
tial message signal to achieve the minimum required SINR
at the IR such that the IR experiences no interference at
all [31], [35]. The remaining power is distributed isotropically
onto the null space of the legitimate channel to yield as much
interference as possible. Formally, the optimization problem
can be represented as
min
bd,z
ρPt ‖bd‖2 + (1 − ρ)Pt ‖z‖2 (13a)
s.t.
ρPt
∣
∣hTd bd
∣
∣
2
(1 − ρ)Pt
∣
∣hTd z
∣
∣
2 + σ 2d
≥ d, (13b)
= ⊥hd, (13c)
where ⊥ = INT −hdhHd /‖hd‖2 is the orthogonal complement
projection matrix of hd. The optimal ρ is chosen such that the
legitimate IR’s SINR requirement in (13b) is just met, i.e.,
ρPt
∣
∣hTd bd
∣
∣
2
σ 2d
= d, (14)
which yields ρ = σ 2d dPt , with bd = hd‖hd‖2 , and Wn =
(1 − ρ)Pt⊥ is the AN covariance matrix [31], [35].
Essentially, if the QoS requirements in problem (13) are too
demanding, then the problem will be infeasible. Hence the
network designer must set the design parameters realistically
such that the constraint (13b) is reachable within the given
power budget Pt . However, this solution may not in general
yield the best possible SINR for the IR.
B. Constructive Isotropic AN Design
In practice, the conventional approach of allocating mini-
mum power for information transmission and maximum power
for AN transmission may not always result in the maximum
possible secrecy performance. Instead, allowing some extent
of AN to leak to the IR in a constructive-interference fashion,
will contribute to the received SINR at the IR [6], as discussed
in Section III.
In this section, we take the conventional isotropic beam-
forming approach one step forward by exploiting AN con-
structively for the IR to reduce the required power for a
given SINR threshold, thanks to the perfect knowledge of
IR’s CSI. We do this by optimizing the transmitted signal part
(x in (1)), which comprises of the desired symbol and the AN
signals. The direct benefit is that the IR’s SINR requirement
is satisfied to equality investing relatively lower power for
information transmission and the additionally saved power
could be allocated to spreading the AN isotropically within
given power budget. This should further help confusing any
potential eavesdropper. Thus considering the constructive form
of the IR’s SINR, as discussed in Section III, we formulate
the instantaneous total power minimization problem as
P1 : min
bd,z
∥
∥
∥
√
ρPt bd +
√
(1 − ρ)Pt ze− jφd
∥
∥
∥
2
(15a)
s.t.
∣
∣
∣
(
hTd
(√
ρPt bd +
√
(1 − ρ)Pt ze− jφd
))∣
∣
∣
≤
(

(
hTd
(√
ρPt bd +
√
(1 − ρ)Pt ze− jφd
))
−√σdd
)
tan θ, (15b)
‖z‖2 ≥ Pn. (15c)
Note that problem (15) adopts the instantaneous transmit
power (including data symbols) as the objective to minimize,
as opposed to the average transmit power in conventional opti-
mization framework (13). The relaxed angular constraint (15b)
allows a larger feasibility region, which results in a lower
minimum transmit power as we will observe in the simulation
results of Section IX. It is also important to note that the con-
straint (15c) guarantees the minimum AN transmitted power
and Pn is the guaranteed minimum noise transmit level.3 Since
there is no information available about the eavesdropping
channels, the constraint (15c) plays an important role in secure
beamforming design. Since the optimization objective is to
minimize the total transmit power, the optimal solver would
allocate almost zero power to the AN signal without this
constraint. While this is desirable for saving power, it would
not disrupt the eavesdroppers’ reception as required. Thus
the constraint (15c) plays an important role in jamming the
eavesdroppers’ channel yet transmitting at a lower power
compared to the conventional isotropic AN scheme introduced
in the previous subsection. However, the problem (15) is still
not convex due to the non-convex constraint (15c) and the
coupling of the optimization variables. But we can convexify
the constraint (15c) by reformulating it as a geometric mean
constraint (GMC) [36]. The problem is then solved for given ρ.
The optimal ρ can be obtained performing a one-dimensional
searching.
V. STATISTICAL EAVESDROPPER CSI
Suppose that the transmitter does not know the instan-
taneous CSI of the eavesdroppers, but can obtain the CSI
statistics from long-term measures. Unlike traditional channel
training where pilot signals are transmitted to obtain CSI
before actual data transmission begins, statistical CSI can be
estimated based on historical transmissions. In this section,
3It is assumed that the system designer can set this threshold such that the
noise level makes correct decoding by the eavesdroppers extremely difficult.
This may vary depending on the system requirements.
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we assume that the time average can equivalently approxi-
mate the ensemble average due to the ergodicity of random
channels. For the legitimate IR’s MISO channel, we suppose
that the transmitter obtains the perfect CSI through feedback
transmission from the receiver. Let us now define the kth Eve’s
channel correlation matrix as
Re,k = E
{
he,khHe,k
}
= μe,kμHe,k + Qe,k, k = 1, · · · , K ,
(16)
where E{·} indicates statistical expectation, μe,k is the mean
and Qe,k is the covariance of he,k . In fact, the covariance
Qe,k,∀k, indicates the level of CSI uncertainty in second-order
statistics sense. For ease of exposition, let us now assume that
the eavesdroppers’ channels have white covariances, i.e.,
Re,k = μe,kμHe,k + σ 2h,kINT ,∀k, (17)
with σ 2h,k ≥ 0. Obviously, σ 2h,k = 0 indicates the perfect CSI
case which we elaborate in Section VI. The rest of the analyses
in this section is therefore based on the assumption that
σ 2h,k > 0, i.e., the correlation matrix Re,k is a nonsingular
positive definite matrix.
A. Statistical CSI Based Conventional Secure Precoding
With the knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ CSI to some
extent, one can block the eavesdroppers’ interception more
efficiently by generating spatially selective AN. The design
objective is still power minimization under SINR constraint
at the IR, however, with additional secrecy constraints against
eavesdropping. In order to satisfy these secrecy requirements,
conventional secrecy power minimization problem with Eves’
CSI statistics is formulated as [31]
min
Wd,Wn
Tr(Wd) + Tr(Wn) (18a)
s.t.
1
d
Tr(WdRd) − Tr(RdWn) ≥ σ 2d , (18b)
1
e,k
Tr(WdRe,k)−Tr(Re,kWn)≤σ 2e , ∀k, (18c)
Wd  0, Wn  0, rank(Wd) = 1, (18d)
where Rd  hdhHd , Wd  bdbHd , Wn  zzH , and e,k is the
secrecy threshold for the k-th Eve. Conventionally, the non-
convex rank constraint is dropped so that the relaxed problem
can be solved using existing solvers [37]. Interestingly, it has
been proven in [22] and [31] that for a practically represen-
tative class of scenarios, the original problem can be solved
optimally. Although the solutions proposed in [22] and [31]
are optimal from stochastic viewpoint, the hidden power in
the AN signals has been treated as harmful for the desired
information, and hence, either nullified or suppressed. In the
following subsection, we endeavour to develop a precoding
scheme exploiting the AN power constructively for the desired
signal at the IR yet keeping it disruptive to the Eves.
B. Statistical CSI Based Constructive AN Precoding
With perfect CSI of the IR and statistical mean and
covariance of the eavesdroppers’ channels available at the
transmitter, one can design the transmit precoding and the
AN beamforming more effectively. In particular, we aim at
designing the precoders such that the AN is constructive to
the IR while maintaining the conventional secrecy constraints
to the Eves. As such, the plain constructive interference based
secure transmit precoding optimization problem with statistical
Eves’ CSI can be formulated as
min
bd,z
∥
∥
∥bd + ze− jφd
∥
∥
∥
2
(19a)
s.t.
∣
∣
∣
{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}∣
∣
∣
≤
(

{
hTd ×
(
bd+ze− jφd
)}
− σd
√
d
)
tan θ,
(19b)
bHd Re,kbd
zH Re,kz + σ 2e
≤ e,k, ∀k. (19c)
Note that the global optimal solution to the problem (19)
can not be guaranteed due to the secrecy constraint (19c)
with statistical channel knowledge only. Manipulating this
constraint, the problem (19) can be efficiently solved using
convex optimization toolboxes, e.g., CVX [37]. Using the
definition of Wd = bdbHd and Wn  zzH , one can express the
secrecy constraint (19c) as a linear matrix inequality (LMI).
Thus the problem (19) can be expressed as
P2 : min
bd,z
∥
∥
∥bd + ze− jφd
∥
∥
∥
2
(20a)
s.t.
∣
∣
∣
{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}∣
∣
∣
≤
(

{
hTd ×
(
bd+ze− jφd
)}
− σd
√
d
)
tan θ,
(20b)
[
tr
(
Re,kWd
) − tr (Re,kWn
)
σe
σe 1
]
 0, ∀k,
(20c)
[
Wd bd
bd 1
]
 0 Wn  0. (20d)
Note that the constraint (20d) takes care of the rank constraint4
on Wd.
VI. SECURE PRECODING WITH FULL CSI
In this section, we assume that perfect CSI of all
the receivers (including potential eavesdroppers) is available
at the transmitter. This assumption is valid for scenarios where
the eavesdroppers are also active users of the system, possi-
bly for different services. In such cases, the transmitter can
estimate the CSI from the active eavesdroppers’ transmission.
A. Conventional Secure Precoding With Full CSI
With perfect CSI of both the IR and the Eves, the conven-
tional power minimization problem with QoS constraints is
4The problem (20) yields a unit-rank Wd in all Monte Carlo simulations
we performed in Section IX.
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formulated as
P − Conv : min
bd,z
‖bd‖2 + ‖z‖2 (21a)
s.t.
∣
∣hTd bd
∣
∣
2
∣
∣hTd z
∣
∣
2 + σ 2d
≥ d, (21b)
∣
∣
∣hTe,kbd
∣
∣
∣
2
∣
∣
∣hTe,kz
∣
∣
∣
2 + σ 2e
≤ e,k, ∀k. (21c)
The power minimization problem has been solved in many
existing works for different scenarios [21], [31]. One conven-
tional approach is to reformulate problem (21) as the following
semidefinite program (SDP) after relaxing the rank constraint
min
Wd,Wn
Tr(Wd) + Tr(Wn) (22a)
s.t.
1
d
Tr(WdRd) − Tr(RdWn) ≥ σ 2d , (22b)
1
e,k
Tr(WdRe,k)−Tr(Re,kWn)≤σ 2e , ∀k, (22c)
Wd  0, Wn  0. (22d)
However, since the Eves’ CSI is now perfectly known, the cor-
responding channel correlation matrices are obtained as Re,k =
he,khHe,k . The reformulated problem (22) can be optimally
solved using CVX [21], [31].
B. Constructive AN-Based Secure Precoding
In this section, our attempt is to further improve the secrecy
performance utilizing the full knowledge of the available CSI.
Since the perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers is also available,
we can muddle the eavesdroppers reception more efficiently
than the correlation based CSI case in Section V-B. The
concept is that, we will design the AN beamformers such that
the AN signal is constructive to the IR while destructive to
the Eves. As long as some knowledge of the Eves’ channels
is available at the transmitter, one can do so by pushing
the received signal at the IR towards the decision thresholds
(green zone in Fig. 2a) while pushing the received signal
at the Eves away from the decision thresholds (red zone
in Fig. 2b). This makes correct detection more challenging for
the Eves and therefore reduces the receive SINR. The benefit
is that given secrecy thresholds can be guaranteed with lower
transmit power. More importantly, it will be shown in the
following optimization schemes that the secrecy constraints
are guaranteed on a symbol-by-symbol basis, rather than
the conventional statistical guarantees, which are prone to
instantaneous outages.
By denoting αR,k and αI,k as the real and imaginary parts
of y˜e,k  hTe,k
(
bd + ze− jφd
)
, respectively, y˜e,k,∀k, will lay in
the red zone in Fig. 2b if either of the following two constraints
is satisfied
φe,k ≤ −θ ⇒ −αI,k
αR,k − ˜e,k
≤ tan θ, ∀k, if αI,k < 0,
(23a)
φe,k ≥ θ ⇒ αI,k
αR,k − ˜e,k
≥ tan θ, ∀k, if αI,k > 0.
(23b)
Since we aim at keeping the eavesdroppers’ received signal
outside the green (constructive) zone in Fig. 2b, i.e., θ ≤
φe,k ≤ −θ,∀k, we have the entire red zone to search the
optimal point that minimizes the transmit power. That is,
the SINR restriction constraints at the Eves can be represented
by the following system of inequalities
−
{
hTe,k
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
≤
(

{
hTe,k
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
− σe
√
e,k
)
tan θ, ∀k,
(24a)

{
hTe,k
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
≥
(

{
hTe,k
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
− σe
√
e,k
)
tan θ, ∀k,
(24b)
where ˜e,k  σe
√
e,k . Thus exploiting the knowledge of
the interfering signals (AN in this case), the constructive
AN-based precoding design problem with secrecy power min-
imization objective can be formulated as
P3 : min
bd,z
∥
∥
∥bd + ze− jφd
∥
∥
∥
2
(25a)
s.t.
∣
∣
∣
{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}∣
∣
∣
≤
(

{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
− σd
√
d
)
tan θ,
(25b)
(24a) and (24b) satisfied. (25c)
Problem (25) is a standard second-order cone program,
thus can be efficiently solved using interior-point based
solvers [37].
Remark: It is important to note that, by the inclusion of
the data symbols in P1, P2 and P3, the IR’s SNR con-
straint is guaranteed on a symbol-by-sybmol basis, rather than
the statistical secrecy of conventional approaches [20]–[23].
In addition, Eves’ secrecy constraints in P3 are also guar-
anteed during each symbol period. As will be shown in our
results, the statistical constraints of conventional formulation
P − Conv allow a) for the IR’s SINR to instantaneously fall
below the required threshold, thus leading to an IR outage;
b) for the Eves’ secrecy SINRs to be instantaneously higher
than the statistical constraint, thus jeopardising the secrecy of
the useful data. By employing symbol-by-symbol constraints,
the proposed approaches avoid this, and guarantee a continu-
ous enforcement of the IR’s and Eves’ SINRs.
VII. AN EFFICIENT SOLUTION FOR THE SECURE
CONSTRUCTIVE PRECODING PROBLEM
In this section, we attempt to develop an efficient solver for
the secure constructive AN-based precoding design problem.
For brevity, here we explore only the most challenging sce-
nario of constructive-destructive AN precoding problem (25).
However, the proposed solution can be downscaled to solve
other problem formulations as well. Denoting x  bd +
ze− jφd and x¯ 
[{x}T {x}T ]T , the problem (25) can be
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rewritten as
min
x¯
‖x¯‖2 (26a)
s.t. h¯Td x¯ + σd
√
d tan θ ≤ h¯Td x¯ tan θ, (26b)
− h¯Td x¯ + σd
√
d tan θ ≤ h¯Td  x¯ tan θ, (26c)
h¯Te,k x¯ + σe
√
e,k tan θ ≥ h¯Te,kx¯ tan θ, ∀k,
(26d)
− h¯Te,k x¯ + σe
√
e,k tan θ ≤ h¯Te,kx¯ tan θ, ∀k,
(26e)
where h¯d 
[{hd}T {hd}T
]T
, h¯e,k 
[{he,k}T {he,k}T
]T
, and  
[
0K ,K −IK
IK 0K ,K
]
. Now,
by defining the following notations
A  sec θ
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
−h¯Td + tan θ h¯Td 
h¯Td + tan θ h¯Td −h¯Te,1 − tan θ h¯Te,1
h¯Te,1 + tan θ h¯Te,1
...
−h¯Te,K − tan θ h¯Te,K 
h¯Te,K + tan θ h¯Te,K 
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
, c 
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
σd
√
d
σd
√
d
−σe
√
e,1
σe
√
e,1
...
−σe
√
e,K
σe
√
e,K
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
,
we can equivalently rewrite the problem (26) as
min
x¯
‖x¯‖2 (27a)
s.t. − Ax¯ + c ≤ 02K+2, (27b)
where A is a (2K + 2) × 2NT matrix. The Lagrangian dual
function of the problem (27) is given by
L (x¯,λ)  ‖x¯‖2 + λT (−Ax¯ + c) , (28)
where λ ≥ 0 is a (2K + 2) × 1 Lagrangian dual variable
associated with the constraint (27b). Setting ∂L(x¯,λ)∂ x¯ = 02K+2,
we obtain the optimal solution to the problem (27) as
x¯∗ = 1
2
AT λ. (29)
Thus the remaining task to find the optimal x¯∗ is to find
the optimal dual variables λ∗. Substituting x¯∗ into (28),
we formulate the dual problem of (27) as
min
λ
f (λ) 
∥
∥AT λ
∥
∥
2
4
− cT λ. (30)
In general, it is difficult to derive the optimal solution to
the non-negative least-squares problem (30). In the following,
we propose a gradient descent algorithm to solve it. Note that
the gradient of f (λ) is given by
∇ f (λ) = AA
T λ
2
− c. (31)
Algorithm 1 summarizes the gradient descent method for
solving problem (30). Finally, we can obtain the optimal
beamforming vectors from x∗ as follows [8]:
b∗d =
x∗
K + 1 (32)
b∗n,i =
x∗e− jφd
K + 1 ,∀i. (33)
Algorithm 1 Efficient Gradient Descent Algorithm to Solve
Problem (30)
1: Input: A, c.
2: Initialize λ(0) ≥ 0 and i = 0.
3: repeat
4: i:= i + 1.
5: Compute the direction of the gradient ∇ f (λ(i−1)).
6: Choose ai using backtracking linear search to update λ(i):
λ(i) = max
(
λ(i−1) − ai∇ f (λ(i−1)), 02K+2
)
.
7: until convergence.
8: Output: Optimal dual variable λ∗.
VIII. ROBUST PRECODING WITH IMPERFECT FULL CSI
In the previous sections, secure precoding schemes have
been developed assuming partial/statistical/full CSI available
at the transmitter. In this section, we consider a secure commu-
nication scenario where CSI of all nodes is obtainable through
channel training. However, the estimated CSI is imperfect due
to quantization and detection errors. Hence we study robust
AN precoding design based on that imperfect CSI estimates.
We model the imperfect CSI considering the widely used
Gaussian channel error model such that the channel error
vectors have circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
distribution. Thus, the actual channels between the BS and the
IR can be modeled as
hd = hˆd + ed, (34)
and that between the BS and the kth Eve can be modelled as
he,k = hˆe,k + ee,k,∀k, (35)
where hˆd and hˆe,k,∀k, denote the imperfect estimated CSI
available at the BS and ed, ee,k ∈ CNT×1,∀k, represent the
channel uncertainties such that ‖ed‖2 ≤ ε2d, and ‖ee,k‖2 ≤
ε2e ,∀k, respectively.
A. Conventional AN-Aided Robust Secure Precoding
Conventional AN-aided downlink robust secrecy power
minimization problem with SINR constraints is formulated as
min
bd,z
‖bd‖2 + ‖z‖2 (36a)
s.t. min‖ed‖≤εd
∣
∣hTd bd
∣
∣
2
∣
∣hTd z
∣
∣
2 + σ 2d
≥ d, (36b)
max‖ee,k ‖≤εe
∣
∣
∣hTe,kbd
∣
∣
∣
2
∣
∣
∣hTe,kz
∣
∣
∣
2 + σ 2e
≤ e,k, ∀k. (36c)
Due to the spherical channel uncertainty model, constraints
(36b) and (36c) actually involve infinitely many constraints
which makes the problem (36) very difficult to solve. However,
applying S-procedure [22, Lemma 2], the inequality con-
straints in (36) can be transformed into convex LMI constraints
and thus problem (36) can be readily solved using existing
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min
bd,z
∥
∥
∥bd + ze− jφd
∥
∥
∥
2
(37a)
s.t.
∣
∣
∣
{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}∣
∣
∣ ≤
(

{
hTd
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
− σd
√
d
)
tan θ,∀‖ed‖ ≤ εd, (37b)
−
{
hTe,k
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
≤
(

{
hTe,k
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
− σe
√
e,k
)
tan θ,∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe,∀k, (37c)

{
hTe,k
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
≥
(

{
hTe,k
(
bd + ze− jφd
)}
− σe
√
e,k
)
tan θ,∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe,∀k. (37d)
solvers. It has been proved in [23] that whenever problem
(36) is feasible, the corresponding transmit precoding solution
is of rank-one hence optimal.
B. Constructive AN-Aided Robust Secure Precoding
In this section, we aim at constructive AN based robust
secure precoding design with imperfect knowledge of all CSI,
as opposed to its perfect CSI counterpart in Section VI.
With the deterministic channel uncertainty model described
above, we consider worst-case based robust design. Thus the
constructive AN based robust power minimization problem can
be formulated as given in (37) (at the top of the this page).
Note that the information and the AN beamforming vectors
appear in identical form in the objective functions as well as
in the constraints in problem (37). Denoting b  bd + ze− jφd ,
the problem can thus be represented as
min
bd,z
‖b‖2 (38a)
s.t.
∣
∣
∣
∣

{(
hˆd + ed
)T
b
}∣
∣
∣
∣
≤
(

{(
hˆd + ed
)T
b
}
−σd
√
d
)
tan θ, ∀‖ed‖ ≤ εd, (38b)
−
{(
hˆe,k + ee,k
)T
b
}
≤
(

{(
hˆe,k + ee,k
)T
×b} − σe
√
e,k
)
tan θ, ∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe, ∀k, (38c)

{(
hˆe,k + ee,k
)T
b
}
≥
(

{(
hˆe,k + ee,k
)T
b
}
−σe
√
e,k
)
tan θ, ∀‖ee,k‖ ≤ εe, ∀k. (38d)
Considering the real and imaginary parts of each complex
vector separately, we have
hd = hˆR,d + j hˆI,d + eR,d + jeI,d, (39)
b = bR + jbI , (40)
where the subscripts R and I indicate the real and imaginary
components of the corresponding complex notation, respec-
tively. As such, we have the real part,

{(
hˆd + ed
)T
b
}
= hˆTR,dbR − hˆTI,dbI + eTR,dbR − eTI,dbI
= h˜Td b1 + e˜Td b1, (41)
where h˜d 
[
hˆTR,d hˆ
T
I,d
]T
, e˜d 
[
eTR,d e
T
I,d
]T
, and b1 
[
bTR − bTI
]T
. Similarly, the imaginary component can be
expressed as

{(
hˆd + ed
)T
b
}
= hˆTR,dbR + hˆTI,dbI + eTR,dbR + eTI,dbI
= h˜Td b2 + e˜Td b2, (42)
with b2 
[
bTR bTI
]T
. Thus the constraint (38b) can be
explicitly expressed as the following two constraints
max‖ed‖≤εd
h˜Td b2 + e˜Td b2 −
(
h˜Td b1 + e˜Td b1
)
tan θ
+ σd
√
d tan θ ≤ 0 (43)
max‖ed‖≤εd
− h˜Td b2 − e˜Td b2 −
(
h˜Td b1 + e˜Td b1
)
tan θ
+ σd
√
d tan θ ≤ 0. (44)
Similarly, the constraints (38c) and (38d) can be, respectively,
rewritten as
max‖ee,k ‖≤εe
− h˜Te,kb2 − e˜Te,kb2 −
(
h˜Te,kb1 + e˜Te,kb1
)
tan θ
+ σe
√
e,k tan θ ≤ 0 (45)
min‖ee,k‖≤εe
h˜Te,kb2 + e˜Te,kb2 −
(
h˜Te,kb1 + e˜Te,kb1
)
tan θ
+ σe
√
e,k tan θ ≥ 0, (46)
where h˜e,k 
[
hTRe,k h
T
I e,k
]T
. By replacing the CSI error
bounds in these constraints, the robust problem (38) can be
reformulated as
min
b1,b2
‖b2‖2 s.t. (47a)
h˜Td b2 − h˜Td b1 tan θ + εd ‖b2 − b1 tan θ‖
+ σd
√
d ≤ 0 (47b)
− h˜Td b2 − h˜Td b1 tan θ + εd ‖b2 + b1 tan θ‖
+ σd
√
d ≤ 0, (47c)
− h˜Te,kb2 − h˜Te,kb1 tan θ − εe ‖b2 + b1‖ tan θ
+ σe
√
e,k ≤ 0 (47d)
h˜Te,kb2 + h˜Te,kb1 tan θ − εe ‖b2 + b1‖ tan θ
+ σe
√
e,k ≥ 0. (47e)
The SOCP problem (47) can be efficiently solved using
existing solvers [37].
Finally, we analyze the computational complexity of the
problems P1, P2 and P3 based on interior-point method based
solvers. Note that in all three formulations, the number of
decision variables is on the order of 2NT. Let us first examine
problem P1, which has 2 LMI constraints of size 1 (due to
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TABLE I
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED APPROACHES
Fig. 3. Transmit power PT versus required SINR at IR d with NT =
6, K = 3, and e = −5 (dB).
the | · | operation) and 1 SOC constraint of size NT. Thus the
complexity of problem P1 is on the order shown in the first
row of Table I [25], [38]. Similarly, the complexity of problem
P2 and problem P3 can be quantified as shown in the second
and the third row of Table I, respectively. The complexity of
the robust problem (47) is shown in the last row.
IX. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents numerical simulation results to eval-
uate the performance of the proposed constructive interfer-
ence based PLS algorithms in a MISO wiretap channel.
For comparison, conventional secure precoding performances
have also been included. For simplicity, it was assumed that
e,k = e, ∀k and σ 2d = σ 2e = 1. Unless otherwise specified,
N = 3 and QPSK is the modulation scheme considered,
while it has been shown that the concept of constructive
interference also offers benefits to larger scale systems and
higher order PSK and QAM modulations [3], [39]. All the
estimated channel vectors are generated as independent and
identically distributed complex Gaussian random variables
with mean zero and the TGn path-loss model for urban cel-
lular environment is adopted considering a path-loss exponent
of 2.7 [40]. All simulation results are averaged over 1000
independent channel realizations, unless explicitly mentioned.
In the following simulations, we compare the performance
of the proposed approaches with that of the conventional
AN-aided precoding scheme in [31] as the benchmark.
We start the performance evaluation of the proposed con-
structive interference based secure AN precoding schemes
with varying extent of CSI of the eavesdropping nodes avail-
able at the transmitter. Fig. 3 shows the average transmit
power required versus the SINR requirement at the IR for
the no Eves’ CSI case (Section IV), the statistical Eves’ CSI
case (Section V), the full CSI case (Section VI), and the
gradient descent method (Algorithm 1), as compared with
the corresponding conventional AN precoding schemes for
NT = 6, K = 3, and e = −5 (dB). For a fairer comparison,
we set Pt = NTdσ 2d for the isotropic AN design with ρ =
1
2 .
It can be observed that the proposed constructive interference
algorithms achieve significant power gains compared to the
conventional AN precoding schemes. Interestingly, the con-
structive isotropic AN scheme (No CSI) requires lower power
compared to the statistical CSI counterpart, which is due to
the fact that the isotropic AN scheme does not impose eaves-
dropping constraints. However, the superiority of the statistical
CSI algorithm remains in the secrecy guarantee, which we
will observe in the next example. Note that although the
gradient descent algorithm requires higher power compared to
the constructive AN schemes, it requires much lower execution
time yet satisfying the instantaneous SINR constraints [8],
which we will observe in Figs. 5 and 6.
Next, we demonstrate the effects of the different extent
of available Eves’ CSI on the resulting Eve’s SINR. The
histograms of the instantaneously obtained SINRs at the
Eves normalized by the eavesdropping threshold e with
NT = 6, K = 4, for different CSI cases have been plotted
in Fig. 4. The red lines at position 1 indicate the normal-
ized threshold value of the corresponding constraint. It can
be observed that in many cases the instantaneous secrecy
thresholds are not satisfied under the conventional average
Eves’ SINR constraints, which jeopardizes the information
secrecy. For the constructive precoding schemes with no Eve’s
CSI, in line with the conventional precoding, no secrecy can
be guaranteed since there is no explicit secrecy constraint.
However, the statistical Eves’ CSI significantly improves
secrecy guarantee. The Eves’ SINR is perfectly constrained
only with full CSI of all nodes. These results demonstrate
the importance of CSI accuracy for improving information
secrecy.
Fig. 5 shows the average execution time of the algorithms
per optimization versus the number of Eves for the full and
perfect CSI case only, with NT = 6, d = 10 (dB), and
e = −5 (dB). Specifically, we denote the conventional
precoding schemes as ‘Conv Prec’, the constructive inter-
ference based precoding scheme developed in Section VI-B
as ‘Const Prec’ with conventional eavesdropping constraints,
and the destructive interference based scheme in the same
section as ‘Const-Dest Prec’ in the figures below. The gradient
descent algorithm is denoted as ‘Gradient Desc’. Note that
the conventional approach requires the highest time while the
gradient descent approach takes the lowest time. However,
the ‘Const Prec’ and the ‘Const-Dest Prec’ algorithms require
almost identical time to execute. Next, for a fairer comparison
and noting that the proposed optimizations need to be solved
on a symbol basis, we analyze the average execution time
per frame considering the LTE Type 2 downlink TDD frame
structure defined in [41]. In a Type 2 downlink TDD frame,
5 out of the 10 sub-frames are designated for downlink
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Fig. 4. Histogram of the average Eves’ SINR normalized by the threshold e
with NT = 6, K = 4. (a) Conventional precoding. (b) Constructive precoding.
Fig. 5. Average execution time (seconds) versus K with NT = 6,
d = 10 (dB), and e = −5 (dB).
transmission, each containing 14 symbols. Therefore,
the downlink adopts a block size of 70. We consider two cases;
a slow fading case where the channel remains constant for the
whole duration of the frame, and a fast fading case where the
channel is constant only for a signle sub-frame. In a typical
slow fading environment, channel coefficients are assumed to
be constant over one frame duration and hence updated only
once. Thus the conventional precoding scheme executes only
once over a frame duration. However, the proposed symbol-
by-symbol precoding schemes need to execute 70 times over
one frame period. For the fast fading case, the CSI and
hence the conventional optimization is updated 5 times per
frame. It can be seen from Fig. 6 that, while higher than that
of the conventional schemes, the per-frame complexity of
the proposed approaches is still comparable. The significant
performance gains offered by our approaches therefore make
their performance-complexity trade-off favourable.
In the next example, we examine the transmit power require-
ment against the maximum allowable eavesdropping SINR e
assuming perfect CSI of all nodes. Fig. 7 plots the average
Fig. 6. Average execution time (s) versus K for slow/fast fading channels
with NT = 6, d = 10 (dB), and e = −5 (dB).
Fig. 7. Transmit power PT versus required SINR e with NT = 6, K = 4,
and d = 10 (dB).
transmit power PT versus e for NT = 6, K = 4 and
d = 10(d B). The results in Fig. 7 are consistent with those
in Fig. 3 in the sense that the proposed constructive inter-
ference precoding schemes yield the best performance. Note
that the required transmit power for the isotropic beamforming
schemes (No CSI) are invariant of the Eves’ SINR thresh-
old since they do not consider blocking the eavesdroppers.
However, for the other schemes, with the increase in the
allowable SINR threshold at the Eves, the required transmit
power gradually decreases due to the relaxed eavesdropping
constraints. In any case, the constructive interference based
precoding schemes outperform the conventional AN-aided
secure precoding scheme.
Next, we demonstrate the effects of the constructive and
destructive AN on the IR’s as well as the Eves’ SINR con-
straints. The histograms of the instantaneously obtained SINRs
at the IR and Eves normalized by the corresponding thresholds
(i.e., d for the IR and e for the Eves) with NT = 6, K = 4,
for different schemes have been plotted in Fig. 8. The red
lines at position 1 indicate the normalized threshold value of
the corresponding constraints. It can be observed that in many
cases the instantaneous SINR thresholds are not satisfied under
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Fig. 8. Normalized histogram of the average SINR with NT = 6, K = 4.
Fig. 9. Transmit power PT versus required SINR d with NT = 6, K = 3,
e = −5 (dB), and εd = 0.1, εe = 0.3 (dB).
the conventional average SINR constraints for both the IR and
the Eves. Indeed, the IR has instantaneous SINRs that are
below the threshold requirements, which would lead to SINR
outages. More importantly, the Eves’ receive instantaneous
SINR above the secrecy threshold jeopardizes the information
secrecy. However, the SINR threshold is always satisfied for
the IR under the constructive AN schemes, although the Eves’
SINR is perfectly constrained only under the ‘Const-Dest Prec’
scheme. These results demonstrate significant gain in terms of
information secrecy by the proposed schemes.
Finally, we turn our attention to the imperfect CSI case
(Section VIII), where we analyze the performance of the
proposed robust beamforming designs in Figs. 9 and 10 with
NT = 6, K = 3, e = −5 (dB). In Fig. 9, the robust schemes
indicate the solutions to the problems (36) and (47), respec-
tively, for conventional and constructive precoding schemes
Fig. 10. Transmit power PT versus Eves’ CSI error bound εe with NT =
6, K = 3, εd = 0.1, e = −5 (dB), and d = 5 (dB), 10 (dB).
for εd = 0.1, εe = 0.3. On the other hand, the ‘Non-robust’
scheme is designed treating the imperfect channel estimates
available at the BS as the perfect CSI, hence yields noticeable
performance degradation. However, the proposed construc-
tive interference based robust secure beamforming schemes
demonstrate significant transmit power gains. Fig. 10 shows
the required transmit power of the robust algorithms across a
wide range of Eves’ CSI uncertainty with NT = 6, K = 3,
εd = 0.1, e = −5 (dB), and d = 5 (dB), 10 (dB). It can
be observed that as the CSI error bound increases (i.e., with
lower extent of CSI available at the transmitter), the required
transmit power significantly increases in order to satisfy the
SINR requirements.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed the novel idea of designing the AN-aided
secure precoding schemes as constructive to the IR and
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destructive to the Eves. This introduces a major breakthrough
in the conventional approach of transmitting AN for improving
PLS. The concept opens up new opportunities for expanding
the secrecy rate regions. We studied the downlink transmit
power minimization problem considering both perfect and
imperfect CSI at the BS. Simulation results demonstrated that
significant performance gain is achievable by the proposed
constructive AN precoding schemes compared to the conven-
tional schemes and have established the proposed approach as
a new dimension in the design of PLS.
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